2011-06-23 23 views
16

我們的JVM隨時在 生產中崩潰並出現段錯誤,感覺像某種競爭條件。Sun JVM(JRE jre1.6.0_24)段錯誤NET_Read

設置重現: - 對Linux操作系統Ubuntu 9.10和Debian 4.x的64位多核AMD JRE jre1.6.0_24 - 的Apache Tomcat 6.0.24 ... 6.0.32

與fastdebug抄錄重新編譯的java問題(這個gcc -g1)。 但是,它不會產生更有用的信息,那麼我們在這裏有什麼 。

用調試重新編譯java不會重現問題(這是 gcc -g加上可能一些-DSOMETHING代碼調試標誌)。

任何幫助試圖找出這一點將不勝感激。

使用Oracle的1.6.0_24 jdk生成的核心文件。 gdb變成:

Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault. 
    #0 0x00002aaab7b10666 in NET_Read() from 
    /usr/local/jdk1.6.0_24/jre/lib/amd64/libnet.so 

好吧,所以我的組裝真的真的很生鏽。牢記這一點:

(gdb) info frame 
    Stack level 0, frame at 0x4b3e0040: 
    rip = 0x2aaab7b10666 in NET_Read; saved rip 0x2aaab7b0d53b 
    called by frame at 0x4b3f0090 
      Arglist at 0x4b3dffc8, args: 
    Locals at 0x4b3dffc8, Previous frame's sp is 0x4b3e0040 
    Saved registers: 
    rbx at 0x4b3e0008, rbp at 0x4b3e0010, r12 at 0x4b3e0018, r13 at 
    0x4b3e0020, r14 at 0x4b3e0028, r15 at 0x4b3e0030, rip at 0x4b3e0038 

所以,GDB告訴我們,參數列表是:

0x4b3dffc8 

在數據尋找有:

(gdb) x/8x 0x4b3dffc8 
    0x4b3dffc8:  0x00000000  0x00000000  0x00000000  0x00000000 
    0x4b3dffd8:  0x00000000  0x00000000  0x00000000  0x00000000 

`

所以那裏沒有骰子。同樣,我的程序集可以追溯到第二次wave ska,所以我只能認爲堆棧是有點錯誤的,或者gcc優化標記生成的代碼使用寄存器作爲參數 而不是堆棧?

走上寄存器:

(gdb) info registers 
    rax   0xf2  242 
                rbx   0x4  4 
    rcx   0x2b73aa8bfed3 47775782534867 
    rdx   0x4  4 
    rsi   0x4b3e0050  1262354512 
      rdi   0xf2  242 
    rbp   0x0  0x0 
    rsp   0x4b3dffd0  0x4b3dffd0 
    r8    0xffc 4092 
    r9    0x2b73aa8c61b0 47775782560176 
    r10   0x2b73aa8c9f78 47775782575992 
    r11   0x2b73aa8b20d0 47775782478032 
    r12   0xf2  242 
    r13   0xf2  242 
    r14   0x2aaabad4b9c8 46912767310280 
    r15   0x4  4 
    rip   0x2aaab7b10666 0x2aaab7b10666 <NET_Read+22> 
    eflags   0x10202 [ IF RF ] 
    cs    0x33  51 
    ss    0x2b  43 
    ds    0x0  0 
    es    0x0  0 
    fs    0x63  99 
    gs    0x0  0 

拆裝(在我看來就像它的斷裂在讀+ 22):

0x00002aaab7b10650 <NET_Read+0>:  push %r15 
      0x00002aaab7b10652 <NET_Read+2>:  mov %rdx,%r15 
    0x00002aaab7b10655 <NET_Read+5>:  push %r14 
          0x00002aaab7b10657 <NET_Read+7>:  push %r13 
    0x00002aaab7b10659 <NET_Read+9>:  mov %edi,%r13d 
    0x00002aaab7b1065c <NET_Read+12>:  push %r12 
    0x00002aaab7b1065e <NET_Read+14>:  push %rbp 
    0x00002aaab7b1065f <NET_Read+15>:  push %rbx 
    0x00002aaab7b10660 <NET_Read+16>:  sub $0x38,%rsp 
    0x00002aaab7b10664 <NET_Read+20>:  test %edi,%edi 
    0x00002aaab7b10666 <NET_Read+22>:  mov %rsi,0x8(%rsp) 
    0x00002aaab7b1066b <NET_Read+27>:  js  0x2aaab7b1067c <NET_Read+44> 
    0x00002aaab7b1066d <NET_Read+29>:  lea 1073812(%rip),%rax 
    # 0x2aaab7c16908 <fdCount> 
    0x00002aaab7b10674 <NET_Read+36>:  cmp (%rax),%edi 
    0x00002aaab7b10676 <NET_Read+38>:  jle 0x2aaab7b1070b <NET_Read+187> 
    0x00002aaab7b1067c <NET_Read+44>:  xor %ebp,%ebp 
    0x00002aaab7b1067e <NET_Read+46>:  test %rbp,%rbp 
    0x00002aaab7b10681 <NET_Read+49>:  je  0x2aaab7b106f9 <NET_Read+169> 
    0x00002aaab7b10683 <NET_Read+51>:  lea 0x10(%rsp),%r14 
    0x00002aaab7b10688 <NET_Read+56>:  callq 0x2aaab7b03dd0 <[email protected]> 
    0x00002aaab7b1068d <NET_Read+61>:  mov %rbp,%rdi 
    0x00002aaab7b10690 <NET_Read+64>:  movl $0x0,0x20(%rsp) 
    0x00002aaab7b10698 <NET_Read+72>:  mov %rax,0x10(%rsp) 
    0x00002aaab7b1069d <NET_Read+77>:  callq 0x2aaab7b03f80 
    <[email protected]> 
    0x00002aaab7b106a2 <NET_Read+82>:  mov %rbp,%rdi 
    0x00002aaab7b106a5 <NET_Read+85>:  mov 0x28(%rbp),%rax 
    0x00002aaab7b106a9 <NET_Read+89>:  mov %rax,0x18(%rsp) 
    0x00002aaab7b106ae <NET_Read+94>:  mov %r14,0x28(%rbp) 
    0x00002aaab7b106b2 <NET_Read+98>:  callq 0x2aaab7b043b0 
    <[email protected]> 
    0x00002aaab7b106b7 <NET_Read+103>:  mov %r13d,%edi 
    0x00002aaab7b106ba <NET_Read+106>:  mov 0x8(%rsp),%rsi 
    0x00002aaab7b106bf <NET_Read+111>:  xor %ecx,%ecx 
    0x00002aaab7b106c1 <NET_Read+113>:  mov %r15,%rdx 
    0x00002aaab7b106c4 <NET_Read+116>:  callq 0x2aaab7b04160 <[email protected]> 
    0x00002aaab7b106c9 <NET_Read+121>:  mov %rbp,%rdi 
    0x00002aaab7b106cc <NET_Read+124>:  mov %r14,%rsi 
    0x00002aaab7b106cf <NET_Read+127>:  mov %eax,%ebx 
    0x00002aaab7b106d1 <NET_Read+129>:  mov %rax,%r12 
    0x00002aaab7b106d4 <NET_Read+132>:  callq 0x2aaab7b11000 <endOp> 
    0x00002aaab7b106d9 <NET_Read+137>:  inc %ebx 
    0x00002aaab7b106db <NET_Read+139>:  jne 0x2aaab7b106e7 <NET_Read+151> 
    0x00002aaab7b106dd <NET_Read+141>:  callq 0x2aaab7b04380 
    <[email protected]> 
    0x00002aaab7b106e2 <NET_Read+146>:  cmpl $0x4,(%rax) 
    0x00002aaab7b106e5 <NET_Read+149>:  je  0x2aaab7b10688 <NET_Read+56> 
    0x00002aaab7b106e7 <NET_Read+151>:  mov %r12d,%eax 
    0x00002aaab7b106ea <NET_Read+154>:  add $0x38,%rsp 
    0x00002aaab7b106ee <NET_Read+158>:  pop %rbx 
    0x00002aaab7b106ef <NET_Read+159>:  pop %rbp 
    0x00002aaab7b106f0 <NET_Read+160>:  pop %r12 
    0x00002aaab7b106f2 <NET_Read+162>:  pop %r13 
      0x00002aaab7b106f4 <NET_Read+164>:  pop %r14 
      0x00002aaab7b106f6 <NET_Read+166>:  pop %r15 
      0x00002aaab7b106f8 <NET_Read+168>:  retq 
      0x00002aaab7b106f9 <NET_Read+169>:  callq 0x2aaab7b04380 
    <[email protected]> 
    0x00002aaab7b106fe <NET_Read+174>:  movl $0x9,(%rax) 
    0x00002aaab7b10704 <NET_Read+180>:  mov $0xffffffff,%eax 
    0x00002aaab7b10709 <NET_Read+185>:  jmp 0x2aaab7b106ea <NET_Read+154> 
    0x00002aaab7b1070b <NET_Read+187>:  movslq %edi,%rax 
    0x00002aaab7b1070e <NET_Read+190>:  lea (%rax,%rax,2),%rbp 
    0x00002aaab7b10712 <NET_Read+194>:  lea 1073639(%rip),%rax 
    # 0x2aaab7c16900 <fdTable> 
    0x00002aaab7b10719 <NET_Read+201>:  shl $0x4,%rbp 
    0x00002aaab7b1071d <NET_Read+205>:  add (%rax),%rbp 
    ---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--- 
    0x00002aaab7b10720 <NET_Read+208>:  jmpq 0x2aaab7b1067e <NET_Read+46> 
    0x00002aaab7b10725 <NET_Read+213>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b10726 <NET_Read+214>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b10727 <NET_Read+215>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b10728 <NET_Read+216>:  nop 
    0x00002aaab7b10729 <NET_Read+217>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b1072a <NET_Read+218>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b1072b <NET_Read+219>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b1072c <NET_Read+220>:  nop 
    0x00002aaab7b1072d <NET_Read+221>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b1072e <NET_Read+222>:  data16 
    0x00002aaab7b1072f <NET_Read+223>:  nop 

望着用於NETRead的源代碼:

jdk/src/solaris/native/java/net/linux_close.c 

    *snip* 
    /* 
      * Macro to perform a blocking IO operation. Restarts 
    * automatically if interrupted by signal (other than 
      * our wakeup signal) 
    */ 
    #define BLOCKING_IO_RETURN_INT(FD, FUNC) {  \ 
     int ret;         \ 
     threadEntry_t self;       \ 
       fdEntry_t *fdEntry = getFdEntry(FD);  \ 
       if (fdEntry == NULL) {      \ 
      errno = EBADF;       \ 
      return -1;        \ 
     }           \ 
     do {          \ 
      startOp(fdEntry, &self);    \ 
      ret = FUNC;        \ 
      endOp(fdEntry, &self);     \ 
     } while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);  \ 
     return ret;         \ 
    } 

    int NET_Read(int s, void* buf, size_t len) { 
     BLOCKING_IO_RETURN_INT(s, recv(s, buf, len, 0)); 
    } 

謝謝。

+1

這是Sun Java還是OpenJDK? –

+3

這個主題說「太陽」 – skaffman

+0

可重複的JVM崩潰很有趣:這是我的一個... http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2299250人們會告訴你,如果你的發行版沒有正式支持,你是SOL (恕我直言,有點傻,但不管;) – SyntaxT3rr0r

回答

0

是getFdEntry宏還是內聯?我會在那裏看。基於彙編程序代碼轉儲,seg故障發生在第一個分支之前,就在初始棧操作之後,並且這使得它看起來在getFdEntry中的某處。另外,考慮到讀取的調用被包裝在看起來像鎖定/解鎖操作的可疑內容中,我認爲您對競爭狀態的懷疑可能是好的。沒有看到源代碼的其餘部分,這很難說,但我最好的猜測是getFdEntry是一個內聯函數,它不是線程安全的,因爲它應該是